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PATENT CITATION NETWORKS REVISITED:
SIGNS OF A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
CHANGET
KATHERINE J. STRANDBURG, GABOR CSARDI, JAN TOBOCHNIK,
PtTER tRDI, AND LASZLO ZALANYI**

This Article reports an empiricalstudy of the network composed
of patent "nodes" and citation "links" between them. It builds
on an earlierstudy in which we argued that trends in the growth
of the patent citation network provide evidence that the explosive
growth in patenting in the late twentieth-century was due at least
in part to the issuance of increasingly trivial patents. We defined
a measure of patent stratification based on comparative
probability of citation; an increase in this measure suggests that
the United States Patent and Trademark Office is issuing patents
of comparatively less technological significance. Provocatively,
we found that stratification increased in the 1990s during the
"patent explosion." Here we report a further study indicating
that the trend toward increasing stratification leveled off
beginning around 2000. This observation suggests that there was
a de facto tightening of patentability standards well before the
doctrinal shifts reflected in the Supreme Court's flurry of patent
activity beginning around 2005.
We also investigate the
possibility that changes in our measure of stratificationare due to
* Copyright © 2009 by Katherine J. Strandburg, Gfbor Csfrdi, Jan Tobochnik, Peter
Erdi, and L~szl6 Zal6nyi.
** Katherine J. Strandburg is Professor, DePaul University College of Law and was
Visiting Professor, Fordham University School of Law (Fall 2008). G~ibor Cs~rdi is
currently a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Medical Genetics, University of
Lausanne, Switzerland. Much of this work was completed while he was a doctoral student
at the Department of Biophysics, KFKI Research Institute for Particle and Nuclear
Physics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary, and Center for
Complex Systems Studies, Kalamazoo College. Jan Tobochnik is Dow Distinguished
Professor of Natural Science, Department of Physics, Kalamazoo College. Pter lrdi is
Henry Luce Professor, Departments of Physics and Psychology, Kalamazoo College, and
Head, Department of Biophysics, KFKI Research Institute for Particle and Nuclear
Physics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary. Liszl6 Zaldnyi is a
doctoral student, Department of Biophysics, KFKI Research Institute for Particle and
Nuclear Physics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary, and Center
for Complex Systems Studies, Kalamazoo College. We are grateful to the American
Institute of Physics for providing the data we used in the study described in Part II.D.1 of
this Article.
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something other than changes in patentabilitystandards. While
not conclusive, our results suggest that neither shifts in
predominance of technological areas nor changes in citation
practice account for our observations. We have thus identified
an apparentpuzzle: What happened around 2000 to cause a de
facto tightening ofpatentabilitystandardsat the USPTO?
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INTRODUCTION

In our 2006 article, Law and the Science of Networks: An
Overview and an Application to the "Patent Explosion,"' we argued
that the emerging interdisciplinary field of network science, which
seeks to understand the structure, growth, and behavior of a variety
of network systems, would provide a useful conceptual and analytical
perspective on many questions of interest to legal scholars2 because of
the ubiquity of networks, such as social networks, transportation
networks, and communication networks, as objects of legal doctrine.

1. Katherine J. Strandburg, Gtbor Csirdi, Jan Tobochnik, Pdter Erdi & Liszl6
Zalinyi, Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the "Patent
Explosion," 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1293 (2006).

2. Id. at 1300-18.
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We then applied the network approach to the patent citation
network-a network composed of patent "nodes" and citation "links"
between them.' We argued that trends in the growth of this network
provide insights into the nature of the patent explosion of the past
few decades.' Most provocatively, our study demonstrated that a
measure of patent stratification decreased in the 1980s and then
increased in the 1990s, suggesting that comparatively more trivial
patents were being issued throughout the 1990s.' We hypothesized
that the increasing stratification during the 1990s might be related to
changes in legal doctrine, such as a weakening of the nonobviousness
requirement.6
In this Article, we look more closely at the period beginning
around 2000 and find that the trend toward increasing stratification
appears to have leveled off, though stratification remains greater than
it was in the 1980s.' The number of patents issued by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") per year also began
to level off around 2000, despite the fact that the number of
applications continued to climb steeply.' These observations suggest
that there was a de facto tightening of patent standards well before
the doctrinal shifts reflected in the Supreme Court's flurry of patent
activity beginning around 2005.1 Though we consider some possible

3. Id. at 1329-40. In Part I.B, infra, we reprise parts of that discussion as necessary

to make our present arguments.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1300-10.
Id. at 1333-37.
Id. at 1338.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Figure 6.
See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S ..

...

128 S. Ct. 2109,

2122 (2008) (holding that the patent exhaustion doctrine precludes a patent holder from
asserting a claim against a third-party purchaser); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 418 (2007) (rejecting a rigid requirement that obviousness be demonstrated by

evidence of a "teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine" prior art references);
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 456 (2007) (rejecting an expansive

interpretation of infringement provision involving component parts of a patented product
manufactured domestically but assembled and sold abroad); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 137 (2007) (holding a party is not required to break a
license agreement "before seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court that the

underlying patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed"); Lab. Corp. of Am.
Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting)

(criticizing the Court for choosing not to decide this case and supporting a more restrictive
view of patentable subject matter); eBay Inc. v. MereExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394
(2006) (holding that standard principles of equity apply when granting injunctive relief in
patent disputes); Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45-46 (2006)

(finding that a patent does not automatically confer market power); Merck KGaA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 208 (2005) (holding "the use of patented
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explanations for this de facto tightening, its cause remains an open
question for further research.
In our studies, the "nodes" of the network are U.S. patents and
the "links" are citations of one patent by another. ° In analyzing the
patent citation network, we have used the Hall, Jaffe, and
Trajtenberg dataset, which includes approximately sixteen million
citations made by the more than two million patents issued by the
USPTO from 1975 through 1999," supplemented with updated

citation data obtained from the USPTO that extends through 2006.12
We briefly review our earlier results, which suggested that the
standard for patentability loosened during the 1990s, in Part I. In
Parts II.A and II.B, we describe our updated stratification study,
which suggests that the patentability standard has tightened up again
since around 2000. In Parts II.C and II.D, we consider alternative
explanations for our stratification parameter observations.
In Part II.C, we investigate whether the observed changes in
average stratification can be explained by changes in the mixture of
technical categories among issued patents. To study this question, we
employ the division into six technical categories used in the Hall,
Jaffe, and Trajtenberg dataset."3 Though there are some differences
between categories in the evolution of the stratification parameter,
the overall pictures are similar. Patent stratification increased in all
categories during the 1990s. We also see the beginnings of a plateau
around 2000 in all categories, though our data for the years after 2000
have not been categorized. 4
In Part II.D, we consider the possibility that changes in citation
practices, rather than changes in patent characteristics, were
compounds in preclinical studies is protected" and is not infringement in most
circumstances).
10. U.S. patents also cite scientific literature and foreign patents. Our data do not
include these additional links.
11. See Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The NBER PatentCitations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, in PATENTS, CITATIONS
& INNOVATIONS: A WINDOW ON THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 403, 407-09 (Adam B.
Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg eds., 2002), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/
8498.html. Our analysis includes all of the patents and citations in the database. We did
not randomly sample the data.
12. Data are available from the USPTO on a weekly basis. See U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office, Weekly Bibliographic Files Information Data for Patent Grants and
Published Patent Applications, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/patdata.html (last visited
Apr. 24, 2009).
13. See Hall et al., supra note 11, at 415.
14. We did not categorize the data we obtained directly from the USPTO. We used
the available categorization from the National Bureau of Economic Research ("NBER")
database, which ran only through 1999. See id. at 407.
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responsible for the changes in stratification that we observe. Our
investigation is preliminary and cannot rule out this possibility, but
finds no evidence that citation practice has changed so as to account
for the changes in stratification.
We conclude our analysis by discussing some issues for further
research, including the need to determine why stratification reached a
plateau beginning around the turn of this century and the possibility
that recent tightening of the legal standards for patentable subject
matter and nonobviousness will result in further decreases in
stratification.
I. STRATIFICATION OF PATENT CITABILITY: REVIEW OF OUR
EARLIER RESULTS

A.

Background

During the 1980s and 1990s, there was a major upsurge in
patenting (see Figure 1) and an expansion of patent eligibility in the
United States, with the courts ruling in favor of the patentability of
living things, software, and business methods.15 During the same
period, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was
established to hear the vast majority of patent appeals in the United
States.16 This expansion in patenting led to widespread debate about
patent quality and overpatenting. 17
To accomplish its
15. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981) (upholding patentability
of computer monitoring of rubber molding process); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303, 318 (1980) (upholding patentability of living things); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the contention
that there is a categorical business method exception to patentability), abrogated on other
grounds by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
16. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006)). For a history of the Federal Circuit, see
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, About the Court,
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
17. For a sample of the many discussions about patent quality and overpatenting, see
generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND
ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); NAT'L RESEARCH
COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen
A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL
OF THE NAT'L ACADS., PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Wesley M.
Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in
Biotech PatentPolicy, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 985 (2005); David E. Adelman & Kathryn

L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1677 (2007); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing

1662

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

constitutionally-mandated objective of promoting technological
progress, 18 patent protection must be carefully tailored to balance its
benefits against its costs. The benefits may include providing
incentives to invent, functioning as a signal of technical competence,
and facilitating a market for intangible knowledge. 9 However,
because a patent provides exclusive rights to practice the patented
technology, patents impose costs on society that may include not only
supra-competitive pricing of patented products but also increased
barriers to building upon existing technology. Empirical investigation
of the patent system can play an important role in understanding how
to maintain the appropriate balance. For example, empirical studies

Complexity of the United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77 (2002); Dan L. Burk &
Mark A. Lemley, Designing Optimal Software Patents, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN FRONTIER INDUSTRIES: SOFTWARE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY 81 (Robert W.
Hahn ed., 2005); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L.
REV. 1575 (2003); Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an Evidentiary
Lens: The "Suggestion Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1517 (2006);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769 (2004); Bronwyn H. Hall,
Exploring the Patent Explosion, 30 J. TECH. TRANSFER 35 (2005); Michael A. Heller &
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent
System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 (2002); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
An Empirical Analysis of the Patent Court, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 111 (2004); Allan N.
Littman, Restoring the Balance of Our Patent System, 37 IDEA 545 (1997); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363 (2001); Gregory
N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias
Renders Patent Decisions Irrational,67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391 (2006); Ronald J. Mann, Do
Patents FacilitateFinancingin the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961 (2005); Robert
P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577 (1999);
Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 19002000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Arti K. Rai,
Allocating Power over Fact-Findingin the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 907
(2004); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-InstitutionalApproach to Patent
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY
AND THE ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe, Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2000); John R.
Thomas, Formalism at the FederalCircuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771 (2003); John L. Turner,
In Defense of the Patent Friendly Court Hypothesis: Theory and Evidence (Dec. 2004)
(working paper), available at http://www.terry.uga.edu/-jlturnerPatentFCH.pdf.
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
19. For a discussion of the various theories regarding the benefits of patent
protection, see generally Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66
OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005).
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make it possible to observe and quantify the effects of technological
and doctrinal changes.2 z
Figure 1. Numbers of patents issued and applicationsfiled as a
function of time.
Patents over Time
500000

450000

400000

350000

300000

250000
E
Z

200000
150000
100000
50000

0 41850

1900

1950

2000

2050

Year

In our earlier work, we found that, in addition to burgeoning
growth in patent numbers during the 1990s, there was an increasing
stratification of patent "citability, ' 21 by which we mean the
probability that a patent with particular characteristics will be the
object of a citation in a subsequent patent application. In this Part,
we review some of those results. With that context in place, we then
describe our updated study of patent stratification in Part II.
20. See, e.g., Andrew Chin, Search for Tomorrow: Some Side Effects of Patent Law
Automation, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1617, 1641-50 (2009) (examining the effect of search engine

technology on patent citation practice).
21. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1329-51. We define citability by the probability
that a given patent will be the object of the next citation depending on its current age and
number of previous citations. Note that citability is normalized to back out the fact that

there may be more patents of one value of (kl) than of another. When citability is larger
for one set of parameter values than for another, it means that the probability of being
cited is greater for each individual patent with those characteristics.
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Some Patent CitationBasics

The USPTO issues patents after examining applications to
determine, among other things, whether the patent claims meet the
legal requirements of novelty and nonobviousness 2 Patent claims
are specific statements of the scope of the legal coverage of a patent.
As noted above, the legal effect of a patent is to provide the patentee
a right to exclude others from using the claimed technology without a
license, as detailed in the infringement provisions of the patent
statute. 3
In the course of the examination of a patent application for
novelty and nonobviousness, patent claims are compared against
potential prior art, consisting in large part of prior patents and other
publications in relevant technical fields. Applicants, their patent
attorneys, and the official patent examiners all identify potential prior
art. To qualify for a patent, the claimed invention must be novel,
meaning there is no prior patent or other prior art that is identical to
what is claimed. 4 More importantly, the claimed invention must be
nonobvious, meaning that at the time it was invented, the invention
would not have been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the
art in the field of the invention. Seeking out prior art patents (and
other sources of prior art) is key to determining both novelty and
nonobviousness.
An issued patent cites another patent if the cited patent's
technical relationship to the claimed technology is close enough that
it is relevant to determining whether the claimed technology is new
and nonobvious. 26 A citation from one patent to another may
indicate either that the later patent builds upon the technology of the
earlier patent or simply that the earlier technology was closely
enough related to be material to determining whether the later patent
should be issued." Good evidence shows that, at least on average, the

22. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103, 112 (2006) (detailing the main statutory requirements
for patentability); see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES §§ 2131, 2144 (8th ed., rev.
7 2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html [hereinafter
MPEP] (describing rejection under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103).
23. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
24. See 35 U.S.C. § 102.
25. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
26. See MPEP, supra note 22, § 707.05.
27. See id.
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number of citations received by patents is indicative of their technical
value. 8
Recent studies show that patent examiners provide a large
fraction of the cited references. During the period from 2001 to 2003,
for example, examiners provided sixty-three percent of all citations.2 9
Indeed, in forty percent of the patents granted, examiners provided
all citations. 3' Because such a large fraction of references are
provided by patent examiners and common patent prosecution
practice suggests that another large group is provided by patent
attorneys, citations do not generally indicate a direct flow of
knowledge.
We therefore treat them only as indications of
technological relationships and, on average, as proxies for technical
value. One can thus view the patent citation network as a kind of
map of the space of patented technology, indicating the technical
relationships between various pieces of "property" in that space.31 In
the next Section, we describe our study of how that map has evolved
over time and interpret that evolution.
C.

The Evolving Patent CitationNetwork: IncreasingStratification
in the 1990s

In our earlier paper, we demonstrated that patents have become
increasingly stratified in their citability since the late 1980s.32 Our
approach was motivated by statistical physics studies of a diverse
range of other growing networks.3 3 We modeled the evolution of the
28. See, for example, John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 449
n.60 (2004) and citations therein for a discussion of the connection between citations
received and patent value.
29. Juan AIc~cer & Michelle Gittelman, Patent Citations as a Measure of Knowledge
Flows: The Influence of Examiner Citations, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 774, 774 (2006); see
also Juan Alcicer, Michelle Gittelman & Bhaven N. Sampat, Applicant and Examiner
Citations in US Patents: An Overview and Analysis 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch. Strategy Unit,
Working Paper No. 09-016, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1273016 (providing
empirical data regarding citations in patent applications).
30. Alcicer & Gittelman, supra note 29, at 775.
31. Of course, this map is neither perfect nor complete. Examiners and applicants
may miss relevant connections between patents, cite particular patents because they are
familiar, and so forth. The analysis here assumes only that citations generally indicate
technological relationships between citing and cited patents.
32. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1338-39.
33. See generally ALBERT-LASZLO BARABASI, LINKED: THE NEW SCIENCE OF
NETWORKS (2002) (examining the development and evolution of networks); S.N.
DOROGOVTSEV & J.F.F. MENDES, EVOLUTION OF NETWORKS: FROM BIOLOGICAL
NETS TO THE INTERNET AND WWW (2003) (discussing the characteristics of networks
from social networks to biological networks to electronic networks); MODELS AND
METHODS IN SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS (Peter J. Carrington, John Scott & Stanley
Wasserman eds., 2005) (considering various statistical analysis methods and mathematical
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patent citation network in terms of the probability that a particular
patent will be cited by the next citation made. We studied the
dependence of this "citability" function on a patent's age and the
number of times it has been cited previously.34 We used the number
of times a patent is cited as an approximate proxy for its technical
value."
Looking at the way in which citability depends on the
number of citations received, we determined a stratification
parameter that measures the extent to which the citability of the most
citable patents exceeds that of the least citable patents.36 We
interpreted this parameter as an indicator of the degree of
stratification of patent technical value.37
Because a case-by-case evaluation of the underlying reasons that
one patent might cite another is impossible for a large network of
citations, we used a random attachment model and analyzed the
network in terms of objective characteristics that we expected to be
reflective, on average, of the underlying citation process.3" Of course,
the fact that we extracted a citation "probability" is not meant to
suggest that the particular citation choices made by patent examiners
or applicants are actually random. In reality, though there is only one
U.S. patent citation network, and it did not evolve randomly. Instead,
the network reflects the citation choices that examiners and
applicants made over time. Our approach depended only on the fact
that, cumulatively, those individual citation decisions result in a
likelihood of citation which depends in interesting ways on
characteristics that we can observe.

models for networks); ROMUALDO PASTOR-SATORRAS & ALESSANDRO VESPIGNANI,
EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNET:

A STATISTICAL PHYSICS APPROACH

(2004) (applying a statistical physics approach and complex systems theory in examining
the development and organization of the internet); DUNCAN J. WATTS, SIX DEGREES:
THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE (2002) (detailing the empirical research of several
pioneer researchers in the study of networks); R6ka Albert & Albert-Liszl6 Barabisi,
Statistical Mechanics of Complex Networks, 74 REVS. MODERN PHYSICS 47 (2002)
(reviewing advances in complex networks); M.E.J. Newman, The Structure and Function
of Complex Networks, 45 SIAM REV. 167 (2003), available at http://arxiv.org/
PScache/cond-mat/pdf/030310303516v1.pdf (same).
34. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1333-37. More specifically, we find that the
probability function P(l,k,t) can be written to a good first approximation as the ratio of a
time-independent citability function, A(k,l), and a time-dependent scale factor, S(t). The
scale factor S(t) is just the sum of A(k,l) over all existing patents at time t. Thus, S(t)
changes over time only because the number of patents of age I and connectedness k
changes.
35. Id. at 1334.
36. Id. at 1336-37.
37. Id. at 1337.
38. Id. at 1333-35.
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In our initial study, we assumed that the probability that a
particular patent will be cited at a given time depends primarily on
two characteristics: its age, which we called 1 and measured in terms
of numbers of patents issued; and the number of times it has already
been cited, which we called k.39 The citability function, which we
denoted A(kl), is proportional to the average likelihood that a patent
with k previous citations of age 1 will be the object of the next
citation.4" Our assumption that the probability that a patent will be
cited depends on its age requires little explanation-technology tends
to become obsolete.
Our expectation that citability would depend on the number of
previous citations arises out of studies of other networks. In many
networks, nodes with large numbers of neighbors (here, citations)
tend to accrue even more neighbors as the network grows.41 This
phenomenon, known as "preferential attachment," is plausibly
expected in the patent citation network because of at least two
factors. First, considerable statistical evidence suggests that highly
cited patents are more valuable and may be of greater technological
merit than less frequently cited patents.4 2
We expect more
meritorious patents to accumulate more and more citations. Second,
technology has its own "popular crowd," depending on what field is
"hot" at a particular time. In our analysis, we thus assumed that the
citability varied with the number of previous citations to a patent, k.
To find the likelihood of citation for given k and 1, we developed
a novel iterative technique, which we used to extract the citability
function from the patent citation data. Our technical publications
describe the approach used in that previous article in detail.43 In that
analysis, we did not assume a particular functional form for
39. For a more complete description of our data analysis procedure in that earlier
work, see generally Gdbor Csfrdi, Katherine Strandburg, Liszl6 Zalinyi, Jan Tobochnik,
& PEter Erdi, Modeling Innovation by a Kinetic Description of the Patent Citation System,
374 PHYSICA A 783 (2007). For a detailed discussion of that earlier work and of the work
described in this Article, see generally Gdbor Csirdi, Katherine J. Strandburg, Jan
Tobochnik, & P6ter trdi, The Inverse Problem of Evolving Networks-with Application to
Social Nets, in HANDBOOK OF LARGE-SCALE RANDOM NETWORKS (B61a BollobAs,
R6bert Kozma, & Dezs6 Mikl6s eds., forthcoming May 2009) (manuscript at 1, on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter Csdirdi et al., Inverse Problem]; Gdbor
Csfrdi, Modeling Complex Systems By Evolving Networks (2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
40. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1334 & n.113 and accompanying text.
41. See Albert & Barab~isi, supra note 33, at 71; Newman, supra note 33, at 213-18.
42. See, e.g., Allison et al., supra note 28, at 449 n.60 (noting studies of the relationship

between patent citations and patent value).
43. See supra note 39.
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citability-we derived the functional form directly from the data. In
principle, however, our choice of variables (age and previous number
of citations in our previous article) and the specifics of how we extract
the citability function might have influenced our results. We return to
these points below when we discuss our updated results."
In our previous study, we determined that the dependence of
citability on age, 1, and number of previous citations received, k, is
approximately separable into a factor depending on 1 and a factor
depending on k. Even though the probability of being cited depends
on age, the way in which it depends on k is more or less the same for
patents of any age. In other words, A(k,l) - Ak(k) • A(l).45 This
separability is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows that the
dependence of citability on previous citations received, Ak(k), is
essentially the same for a range of different patent ages.
Figure2. The dependence of citability on number of citations
previously received for patents of various ages (where age is measured
in numbers of laterpatents issued).
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As Figure 2 demonstrates, the more often a patent has already
been cited (the higher its value of k), the more likely it is to be cited
again (the higher its value of A(k))-thus demonstrating preferential
attachment. Preferential attachment is cumulative-because highly
cited patents are more likely to be cited, they become even more

44. See infra Part IIA-B.
45. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1335 & n.115.
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highly cited and thus even more likely to be cited, and so forth.46 The
pattern of citability shown in Figure 2 thus eventually leads to the
extremely skewed distribution of citations received by patents shown
in Figure 3.47 Most patents are hardly cited at all, while a few patents
become citation "billionaires" (well, "hundredaires," really). This
general picture of a highly skewed patent citability reflecting highly
skewed patent value is now well known.48
Figure3. Frequency distribution (on a logarithmic scale) of
number of citations received at various times in the evolution of the
patent citation network.
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Our network analysis allowed us to go beyond this general
observation, however, to ask just how stratified patent value is. We
measured stratification by determining how much more citable the
most citable patents are as compared to the least citable patents. We
also determined how the extent of stratification has evolved over
time. If more patents were being issued simply as a result of faster or
broader technological progress, we would expect the degree of
46. This is sometimes called the "rich get richer" phenomenon or the "Matthew
effect." See Newman, supra note 33, at 213.
47. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1335 & n.115.
48. See, e.g., James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from
Empirical Research on Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 8 (2005); F.M.
Scherer & Dietmar Harhoff, Technology Policy for a World of Skew-Distributed
Outcomes, 29 RES. POL'Y 559, 559-60 (2000).
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stratification to remain about the same over time.49 On the other
hand, if the patentability standard were lowered, there would be not
only more patents issued but a higher proportion of them would be
more technically trivial-the degree to which highly citable patents
dominate trivial patents would increase. Looking at Figure 2, we can
quantify the rate at which citability increases with previous citations
by noting that Ak(k) is closely fit by the form Ak(k) - k'. The
parameter ax is a measure of the extent to which highly cited patents
are preferred, or what we call patent stratification.
We measured the evolution over time of the degree of
stratification by calculating a using only the patents within a 500,000patent sliding time window and calculating a value for x after every
100,000 patents.
The value of ax, and hence the degree of
stratification of patent citability, has varied over time. Figure 4 shows
the results of our previous analysis.
Figure4. Stratificationparameter, q, as a function of time.5 °
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49. See infra Part II.D.1. We demonstrate that this relative stability is, in fact, what
one sees in the citation network of a prominent physics journal despite an increasing
number of articles published per year.
50. See Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1360.
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As shown in Figure 4, the stratification of citability, as reflected
in the value of (x, has evolved nonmonotonically. Following a period
of decreasing stratification during the early 1980s, it began to rise in
the late 1980s.5 1 By contrast, Figure 1 shows that the number of
patents issued annually has been rising essentially since the
inauguration of the patent system and rose very rapidly beginning in
the early 1980s. Thus, during a period throughout which the absolute
number of patents issued per year was rising rapidly, the relationships
between those patents were changing. Patent citability became first
less and then increasingly stratified. In the next Part, we discuss new
results for patent stratification since 2000 and then consider some
alternative explanations for the evolution of the stratification
parameter.
II. NEW RESULTS FOR PATENT STRATIFICATION
In this update to our earlier study, we take a closer look at the
behavior of the stratification parameter using a more sophisticated
maximum likelihood approach to finding the citability function and
fitting the citability to determine the stratification parameter.5 2 Part
II.A discusses the methodological improvements. As discussed in
Part II.B, the new method reproduces the declining stratification
during the 1980s and increasing stratification during the 1990s that we
reported in our earlier article. However, the improved method
surprisingly reveals that, rather than increasing from 2000 to 2006,
stratification leveled off around 2000. We also use the maximum
likelihood approach to test the robustness of our results to the
inclusion of some additional parameters in the citability function.
Our basic observations about the evolution of the stratification
parameter are unchanged by including those additional parameters. 3
As we discussed in our earlier article, there are several ways to
interpret the increasing stratification of citability observed between
the late 1980s and 2000.1' We argued that, consistent with societal
concern with "low quality" patents, the most likely possibility was
that the patentability standard was decreasing, resulting in the
issuance of a larger fraction of more trivial-and hence less citable-

51. The first data point in Figure 4 aggregates the data from 1957 to 1982. We do not
know what was happening earlier because we do not have sufficient earlier data.
52. For a complete discussion of the maximum likelihood approach, see Cs~irdi et al.,
Inverse Problem,supra note 39, at 7-15.
53. Id. at 22-23.
54. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1338-39.
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patents.55 Another possibility was that the change in stratification
parameter merely reflected changes in the subject matter mix of
patented technologies.56 We address that possibility in Part II.C,
finding that the stratification parameter trends are consistent across
technology classes. Finally, it is possible that the change in citability
stratification reflects some kind of change in citation practices, rather
than a change in patent characteristics. 7 We investigate citation
practice in Part II.D.
A.

Methodological Matters58

In this Section, we give a brief impressionistic description of the
differences between our methodological approaches in this and our
previous article. Our basic approach in both studies is to look for the
probability distribution in a random attachment model that is most
likely to have produced the observed patent citation network. In
other words, we seek to "reverse engineer" the citability function
given the actual patent citation network. Our ultimate goal is to
extract certain interesting features, such as the stratification
parameter, from the citability function we have reverse engineered.
Our approach involves three basic parts:
1) Select variables (such as age, previous number of
citations, and technical category) for the citability
function, A (e).

2) Use a "reverse engineering" method to approximate
the citability, A(*), as a function of those variables
given the empirically observed citation network.
3) Determine the stratification parameter, ct, by fitting
the dependence of A(.) on number of previous
citations, k, to a power law form - k.

In our earlier article, we selected the variables we believed would
be most likely to influence citability: age and number of citations

55. Id. at 1338.
56. Id. at 1339.
57. Id.
58. Readers uninterested in the technicalities of our approach to patent citation
network growth should skip to the next Section of this Article. Readers who would like to
know the details should consult our technical publications. See supra note 39. Here we try
to give just a flavor of the methodological issues.

2009]

PATENT CITATION NETWORKS

1673

previously received.59
We then performed parts 2) and 3)
sequentially. We first used a simple weighted counting method to
reverse engineer the citability function A(kl).
Essentially, this
method approximates the most likely probability distribution by
simply counting the types of links that actually occur in the network. 6'
In other words, if patents with a particular value of k and I are cited
many times, A(kl) should be relatively large. We adjusted the count
so as to assign a higher score for an edge that was added at a later
time when there were more types of nodes available to cite. Also, if a
patent type (particular value of k and 1) is very common in the
network, then a citation to it should not add as much to the score as
citing a more rare type. Applying these basic ideas, we obtained an
approximation to the citability function.
However, the function we obtained is entirely numerical-it is
just a list of values of A for each pair of k and 1 values. To make
sense of the citability function, we needed to fit it to some functional
form. To do this, we assumed, based on the observations shown in
Figure 2, that the dependence of citability on number of citations
previously received was independent of the age of the cited patent.
In other words, A(k,l) = A,(l)Ak(k) and took a power law form, Ak(k)
- V + a, where at is the stratification parameter.61 We then attempted
to fit the data to this form. For a variety of reasons, fitting power law
forms to empirical data is often tricky, especially when, as in our case,
the statistical errors for some data points are much larger than for
others. 62 After experimenting with various approaches, we adopted a
method in which we assumed that the value of a was equal to 1.63
That approach gave us the values of stratification parameter shown in
our earlier article and reproduced in Figure 4 above. However, the
approximation that a equals 1 is not quite correct and particularly
affects our results for the stratification parameter after 2000.
To improve the accuracy of our results, we developed a more
sophisticated fitting method. We used that method to obtain the
more accurate values of the stratification parameter, ax, and the
intercept, a, which we report in this Article. We also use the new
59. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1333-35.
60. Csirdi et al., Inverse Problem, supra note 39, at 6-7.
61. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1336.
62. For a discussion of this issue, see generally M.E.J. Newman, Power Laws, Pareto
Distributionsand Zipfs Law, 46 CONTEMP. PHYSICS 323 (2005).
63. The actual probability of citation is given by A(k,l)IS(t), where S(t) is a
normalization factor obtained by adding up all values of A(kl). For this reason, we can
(and did) arbitrarily set A(O,1) = 1. Setting a= 1 is equivalent to assuming that the
approximate separation A(k,l) = A,(l)Ak(k) is exactly true.

1674

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

method to compare different choices of variables for A(.). Our
original approach gave us a good numerical approximation to the
citability function, A(.), but we had to apply a rather ad hoc method
of fitting that function to obtain the stratification parameter. The
maximum likelihood method that we employ here permits us to
obtain the stratification parameter directly by fitting the original
network data rather than extracting A(k,1) and then fitting it to obtain
c. The catch is that in order to do that we have to assume a
functional form for A(#); here it is reasonable to assume that Ak(k) k' + a. We might worry that any particular functional form we choose
does not do a good job of approximating the citability function. To
determine whether we have chosen a good functional form, we can
generate two versions of A(*): a parameterized version in which we
assume a particular functional form for A(.) and a free form version
in which, as with the counting method, we make no such
assumptions.' 4 If the parameterized citability function fits the data
almost as well as the free form version, then we can conclude that the
assumed functional form accurately represents the network.
To facilitate this comparison, we devised a method for measuring
the "goodness of fit" of citability functions A(.) that use different
variables and different functional forms to describe the network.
Goodness of fit measures how similar a simulated network generated
using our approximate citability function would be to the real patent
citation network.65 Essentially, the goodness of fit measures the
probability that a random network generated using a given citability
function would match the real citation network.
For example, to evaluate how well the power law form, Ak(k) k ' + a, fits the data, we can measure its goodness of fit and compare it
to the goodness of fit we obtain for a free form citability function. If
the goodness of fit is similar in the two cases, then we know that the
power law form is a reasonably accurate representation of the
citability function. We can then rely on values of c and a that we
obtain from the maximum likelihood fit using the power law form. In
our updated study, we obtain very similar values of goodness of fit
64. The maximum likelihood method can also be used to calculate a free form version
of A (kl) similar to what we get from the counting method (essentially a table of numerical
values for various choices of k and /). The main advantage to us of the maximum
likelihood method, however, is that it allows us to extract parameters such as a without
using an ad hoc fitting method.

65. For a detailed discussion of the goodness of fit measure, see Csirdi et al., Inverse
Problem, supra note 39, at 4-5. Basically, the goodness of fit measure permits us to
compare how well various parameterizations of the citability function represent the
observed patent citation network.
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from the free form version and the power law form.66 This means that
we can reliably use the maximum likelihood method to obtain values
for ax and a.
We can also use the goodness of fit measure to examine how
important it is to take into account the dependence of citability on
other variables, such as age, number of citations received, and
technical category. This means, for example, that we can compare a
model in which citability only depends on number of citations
previously received, A(#) = A(k), to a model in which citability
depends on both number of citations received and age, A(*) = A(k,l).
While adding more variables always gives a more accurate fit, the
extent to which the goodness of fit improves when we add a particular
variable allows us to determine whether taking account of that
variable is important. Using this improved approach to fitting the
data, we can simultaneously obtain more accurate values of
parameters such as the stratification parameter, ax, and test whether
we are accounting for the most important variables.
B.

Results for Stratification Parameter-TheTwenty-First Century
Plateau

In this Section, we present our results for the stratification
parameter obtained using the improved method described in Part
II.A. Figure 5 shows the time dependence of the stratification
parameter a for two different sets of variables: 1) using k only (on
the top of the figure); and 2) using k and 1 (on the bottom of the
figure). As we would expect, the precise value of a depends on the
variables we take into account. Notably, however, the general trends
are the same for both sets of variables and are robust to incorporating
various other variables, as we discuss below. The results confirm our
earlier observation that stratification decreased during the 1980s and
rose during the 1990s.

66. Id. at 19.
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Figure5. Time evolution of the stratificationparameterusing two
different sets of characteristics. The top plot is determined using only
the number of citationspreviously received, k. The bottom plot uses k
and age, 1.
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Importantly, however, our more accurate extraction method
reveals a new phenomenon: something appears to have changed
around the year 2000.
Beginning around the year 2000, the
stratification peaked and then either leveled off or began a slight
decline. While patents issued beginning in 2000 remained more
stratified than patents issued during the 1980s, the stratification
stopped increasing. As Figure 6 shows, the number of patents issued
annually by the USPTO also leveled off somewhat around 2000,
despite the fact that the number of applications continued to climb
steeply. 67 The most natural interpretation of these observations is
that the USPTO is no longer lowering the bar to patent issuance (and
may even be raising it).
Figure 6. Number of patent applicationsfiled and patents issued
as a function of time from 1982 through 2007.68
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What might have caused such a tightening of patentability?
Though we cannot answer that question based on our empirical
analysis, a few speculations are possible. One possible explanation
would be a change in legal doctrine that made it harder to obtain
patents. The legal doctrine most directly related to the tightness of
67. The comparison of the number of patents issued in a certain year to the number of
applications submitted during that year is not a measure of the fraction of patent
applications that eventually issue as patents. Patent examination generally takes more
than a year, so the numbers relate to different patents. The comparison is also
complicated by the fact that the USPTO has a growing backlog of applications in at least
some fields. The comparison here is intended only to indicate that something seems to
have happened around 2000 to make it more difficult to get a patent.
68. Data is from the USPTO website. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, U.S. Patent
Activity, Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/
oeip/taffh-counts.pdf (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
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the patentability standard is the nonobviousness requirement. In our
earlier article, we suggested that the increasing stratification we
observed during the 1980s might reflect increasing reliance by the
USPTO on the Federal Circuit's "teaching, suggestion, or motivation
to combine" test for obviousness. 69 Though the fraction of cases
employing that test at the Federal Circuit also leveled off around 2000

(see Figure 7), there does not seem to have been any major doctrinal
change in the nonobviousness standard

that would explain a

retrenchment from the 1990s trend toward looser patentability
standards.
Figure 7. Fractionof Federal Circuitcases involving obviousness that
referred to the "teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine" test as
a function of time.7"
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69. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1338. Under the Federal Circuit's test, a
purported invention combining earlier technology could be deemed unpatentably obvious
only if there were evidence of a specific "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to combine
the prior art. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Telefex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007). Such a "rigid"
test lowers the bar to patentability, see id. at 419, and thus might be associated with
increased issuance of more trivial-and less citable-patents. If the disparity between
most and least citable patents increases, the stratification parameter would also be
expected to increase.
70. These numbers were obtained using LEXIS searches for "(suggestion or
motivation or teaching) w/s combine" (to count references to the suggestion test) and
either a reference to "obvious" in the headnotes (dashes) or at least 5 uses of the word
"obvious" in the case (diamonds). These two methods of counting yield the same
qualitative results, showing an increase in use of the suggestion test throughout the 1990s.
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A second possibility is that the plateau in stratification reflects a
de facto change in the patentability standard at the USPTO based on
a more aggressive application of then-current legal doctrine. In 2000,
for example, the USPTO began its "Second Pair of Eyes Review" of
business method patents, probably tightening up the standard for that
category of patents.7' As we will see below, though, the time
dependence of the stratification parameter is qualitatively similar
across technical categories, at least up through the beginning of the
flattening out of the stratification parameter in 2000.72 Although we
did not isolate business method patents in our analysis, this
uniformity across categories makes it seem unlikely that the Second
Pair of Eyes Review per se was responsible for the change. More
plausibly, the Second Pair of Eyes Review is indicative of a broader
USPTO reaction to public outcry about patent quality, resulting in
tightening of patenting standards in ways that cannot be pinned to
any specific change in doctrine. In any event, the question of what
happened in the early 2000s that apparently stabilized (and perhaps
tightened up) the patentability standard is worthy of further study.
One can also speculate as to what these observations might
suggest about the relationship between the USPTO and the courts in
setting patent doctrine. While the standard story would be that the
USPTO follows the doctrine set by the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court,73 no doubt the real push and pull between the courts
and the agency is more complex. The fact that the stratification
plateau precedes major doctrinal shake-ups in the courts suggests that
perhaps the USPTO plays a proactive role in setting the stage for
doctrinal change through its de facto interpretations of legal doctrine.
In the future, the stratification parameter may give us clues about
the effects of recent major changes in the doctrines of nonobviousness
and patentable subject matter that should make it harder to obtain
patents. In KSR v. Teleflex,74 the Supreme Court overturned the
Federal Circuit's "rigid" reliance on the suggestion test and
articulated a stricter nonobviousness threshold.75 In In re Bilski,76 the
71. For a discussion of this program, see, for example, John R. Allison & Starling D.
Hunter, On the Feasibility of Improving Patent Quality One Technology at a Time: The
Case of Business Methods, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 729, 734-35 (2006).

72. We are unable to investigate category dependence after 2000.
73. Indeed, the USPTO is more subject to judicial interpretation of doctrine than

many agencies because it has no substantive rulemaking authority. See, e.g., Stuart Minor
Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn
from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 297-98 (2007).
74. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
75. Id. at 407.
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en banc Federal Circuit overturned its earlier decision in State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,77 making it
harder to obtain certain kinds of business method patents, which
many have argued are of suspect merit. 78 We might expect these
decisions to result in a decreasing stratification parameter a few years
from now. Thus, it will be worthwhile to track the evolution of the
stratification parameter in the wake of this doctrinal change.
C.

Robustness of Stratification Evolution to Changes in Parameters

To test the robustness of our observations of the time evolution
of the stratification parameter, we considered various changes to our
selection of variables. Most importantly, we were concerned about
the possibility, which we raised in our earlier article,79 that the
average stratification parameter ct was changing not because of
changes in the threshold for patentability but because the subject
matter mix of patented technologies was changing.
Patent
"importance" might be inherently more stratified in one field of
technology than in another because of a difference in the importance
of "pioneer" patents, for example. If so, an increasing prevalence of
patents in that field could change the average degree of stratification.
As shown in Figure 8, the distribution of patents across technological
areas has evolved throughout the period of our study. To rule out the
possibility that the change in stratification was an artifact of changing
predominance of different types of patented technology, we repeated
our analysis allowing the citability function to depend on the technical
categories of the cited and citing patents.80

76. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).
77. 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
78. See, e.g., eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (discussing the "potential vagueness and suspect validity" of some business
method patents).
79. Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1339.
80. Csirdi et al., Inverse Problem, supra note 39, at 21-22.
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Figure8. The proportion of patents issued in six technological
categories as a function of time. The categoriesare described in the
text.
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To define the technological category of a patent, we used six
broad
categories:
Chemical
(CHM),
Computers
and
Communications (C&C), Drugs and Medical (D&M), Electrical and
Electronic (E&E), Mechanical (MCH), and Other (OTH). 1 These
categories were derived by Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg from the 400
patent classes of the USPTO patent classification system. 2
To investigate the dependence of the citability on the
technological category of the citing patent, on the other hand, we
must define and fit a separate citability function for each of the six
categories. The citability function for each citing patent category is
approximately of the form A
, ,ctej = CcitedA k c(k)A
(1), where
Akci ' (k) is of the power law preferential attachment form, A citing (k)
k', from which we can extract a value of a for each citing category.
We can account for the cited category by a multiplicative constant
because the functional dependence of citability on citations

81. Hall et al., supra note 11, at 415.
82. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF

PATENT CLASSIFICATION (2000), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/
classification/; see MPEP, supra note 22, § 902.01; Hall et al., supranote 11, at 414-15.
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previously received does not vary significantly based on the category
of the cited patent.
When we fit the resulting citability functions to obtain the
stratification parameters corresponding to each category of citing
patent, we obtain the results shown in Figure 9.
Figure9. Values of stratificationparameter,a, for the six
categories of citing patent when the fit incorporatesnumber of previous
citations,patent age, and citing and cited category.
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To probe the possibility that the time evolution of the
stratification parameter that we observed in our earlier work is due to
a changing mix of technologies among issued patents, we investigated
the time dependence of the stratification parameters for each
category of citing patent separately. The results are shown in Figure
10.
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Figure 10. Time evolution of the stratificationparametersfor the six
categoriesof citingpatents and the average value.
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As Figure 10 shows, though there were differences in the
magnitude of the change over time, the general trend of declining,
then increasing, stratification is common in all categories. Because
we used the categorizations from the NBER dataset, which extends
only through 1999,"3 we could not investigate fully whether the turn of
the century plateau occurs in all citing patent categories. However,
the beginning of the plateau appears to be visible in all categories in
Figure 10. Of course, because these technological categories are very
broad, it is still possible that a targeted investigation into more
specific categories would reveal greater differences between
technological fields. However, the fact that both "Drugs and
Medical" (symbolized by 'Y' on the graph) and "Computers and
Communications" (symbolized by "A") exhibit the same qualitative
time dependence is an additional indication that the decrease,
subsequent increase, and flattening of the stratification parameter is
likely robust across technologies.
D.

The Possible Effects of Changes in Citation Practiceon the
StratificationParameter

It is also possible that the evolution in citability stratification
reflects a change in citation practice rather than a change in
underlying patent characteristics. Wte skeptical of this possibility,

83. Hall et al., supra note 11, at 407.
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however, because trends in patent citation practice, including most
notably the increased ease of computerized searching for prior art,
seem unlikely to have caused the observed change from decreasing aX
to increasing a during the late 1980s, followed by a leveling off
beginning in 2000. While computerized searching undoubtedly
became more prevalent during the late 1980s and 1990s, for example,
there is no reason to expect that it would have such a nonmonotonic
effect. Nonetheless, we would like to find means to account for
citation practice more directly in our analysis. Here we report two
preliminary steps in this direction.
The first is a direct comparison of the evolution of the
stratification parameter for patent citations to the evolution of the
stratification parameter for citation practice in a different, but
somewhat related, arena-scientific journals. This comparison gives
us two pieces of useful information. First, it allows us to test the
robustness of the stratification parameter itself. If the time evolution
of the stratification parameter for scientific journal citations looks
sensible, then we may be more confident in attributing meaning to its
behavior in the patent citation context. Second, the comparison
allows us to test whether the changes in stratification we observe in
the patent citation network are due to some universal phenomenon,
such as increased computerized searching, that affects all similar
citation practices. If the trends in stratification parameter were the
same for patent citations and journal citations, we could rule out a
patent-specific explanation. However, if, as we show below, they are
different, we cannot completely rule out an explanation based on
patent citation practice, but we can rule out explanations based on
broad trends in citation practice.
The second step reported here is a comparison of characteristics
of the patent citation network to those expected from a simple
general model of citation practice based on a common sense notion of
how scholars find references to cite in their articles. This simple
model is known as the "forest fire model." The fact that the patent
citation network is consistent with the forest fire model bolsters the
reasonableness of the comparison to scientific journal citation
networks and makes it less likely that the observed behavior of patent
citation stratification is due to some unusual mechanism by which
patent citations are selected. The demonstration of consistency with
this simple model lays the groundwork for future attempts to relate
variations in the stratification parameter to the parameters of the
model.
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1. Comparison of the Patent Citation Network to a Scientific Journal
Citation Network
One way to check for the influence of search technology is to
compare the behavior of the U.S. patent citation network with that of
other citation networks, such as the European patent citation network
or the network of citations in scientific journals. Differences between
the behavior of one network and the behavior of others would
indicate that there is some idiosyncratic, underlying cause of the
behavior of the first network. So, for example, if the stratification
parameters for citation networks other than the patent network do
not evolve in a similar way to the patent network stratification
parameter, it is unlikely that the trends observed in the patent citation
network are due to general trends in search technology.
We have made a start in this direction by studying the network of
citations to the premier physics journals, the various forms of the
Physical Review published by the American Physical Society
("APS"). 8' The network of APS citations contains 378,077 papers
and 3,615,892 citations.85 To compare the evolution of citation
behavior in this network to that in the patent citation network, we
performed the same type of fits for the APS network that we
performed for the patent network. The general behavior of citability
that we observed in the APS network was similar to that which we
observed in the patent citation network, with the citability function
separating approximately into age-dependent and degree-dependent
parts.
Just as we did for the patent citation network, we investigated
the time evolution of the stratification parameter for the physics
journal network. The results were quite different. The stratification
parameters for the two systems are shown on the same graph in
Figure 11 for comparison.

84. We obtained the data for this study from the American Institute of Physics, which
is an umbrella organization of which the APS is a member.
85. For an earlier study of the APS network, see Sidney Redner, Citation Statistics
from 110 Years of Physical Review, PHYSICS TODAY, June 2005, at 49, 50.
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Figure 11. Time evolution of the stratificationparameteras
determined by k alone (top) and by k and I (bottom) for the patent
citation network (the lower set of data points) and the physics journal
citation network (the upper set).
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Although the a values for the physics journal citation network
varied a bit over time and there is somewhat more noise in the
journal network data, no systematic changes akin to those observed in
the patent network occurred. During the entire period for which data
is available, the stratification parameter for the physics journal
citation network remained roughly constant following a slight
decrease before 1975. This evolution is in sharp contrast to that of
the patent citation network. We know that physicists are early
adopters of computer technology; for example, they established an
online preprint archive in 1991.86 If the general availability of
computerized searching were responsible for the changes in
stratification parameter we see in the patent citation network, one
might expect to see some effect on the stratification of the physics
journal citation network as well. No such effect is observed.
Citation practice likely differs between physics journals and
patents, so this comparison goes only so far in determining whether
the stratification changes in the patent network are due to substantive
changes in issued patents, rather than to changes in patent citation
practice. We certainly cannot yet reject the possibility that the
changes in stratification for patent citations are due to some change in
patent citation practice other than a general increase in computerized
searching. More research is needed to gain insight into this question.
For example, we might compare the evolution of the U.S. patent
citation network with that of other citation networks, such as the
European patent citation networks.

86. See arXiv.org, The Physics Archive (8/91), http://arxiv.org/new/physics.html (last
visited Apr. 10, 2009).
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2. Comparison to a "Forest Fire" Citation Model
Another approach to understanding the interplay between
citation practice and stratification is to consider a more detailed
model of the underlying citation practice. Such a model can be used
to probe the underlying citation mechanism for the network evolution
and thus can provide insight into what might be causing the global
network features that we observe. If the observed network features
are consistent with the predictions of an intuitive model of citation
practice, for example, one can try to use that model to probe the
observed network more deeply. If the observed features are
inconsistent with a particular intuitive model, we may be able to
deduce something about actual patent citation practice by
determining why this is so.
Here we demonstrate that many observed features of the patent
citation network are consistent with a simple, intuitive model of citing
behavior, which was inspired by scholarly journal practice. The
"forest fire model," proposed by Leskovec et al.,87 is based on a
common sense search strategy in which relevant citations are found
by following citation links recursively so as to cite documents that
have been cited by or cite a known relevant document. The model is
called the forest fire model because each document is only
investigated once; thus, the links spread in a way similar to the way in
which fire spreads between neighboring trees in a forest, burning
trees as it goes.88 In the application to a citation network, a
completely new "fire" is associated with each new document added to
the network.89
While, in reality, authors select documents to cite according to
their relevance to the subject matter of the citing document, this
model approximates the citation process using a random probability
of citing any document that is cited by or cites the most recently cited
document.9 ° More specifically, the model is as follows: when a new
patent is added to the citation network, it first cites a fixed number of
randomly selected other patents; then it checks each of the incoming
87. Jure Leskovec, Jon Kleinberg & Christos Faloutsos, Graphs over Time:
Densification Laws, Shrinking Diameters and Possible Explanations, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ELEVENTH ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE

DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 177, 184-85 (Robert L. Grossman et al. eds., 2005),
availableat http://www.cs.cmu.edu/-jure/pubs/powergrowth-kdd05.pdf.
88. Id. at 185.

89. Id.
90. Id.

2009]

PA TENT CITATION NETWORKS

1689

and outgoing links of these original patents and with some probability
cites those, too. Once a patent has been cited, it is considered
"burned" and cannot be selected again as a jumping-off point.9 1 The
steps are repeated for the newly cited patents until the process "burns
itself out."'
The model thus imitates how an inventor or patent
examiner might find relevant patents based on the citation list and the
"cited-by" list of a patent that has already been cited.
The predictions of the model are consistent with several features
observed in the patent citation network. First, the model predicts
that the frequency distributions of both number of citations received
and number of citations made will be heavy-tailed, decaying
approximately according to a power law at large numbers of
citations. 93 This is exactly what we see in the patent citation network,
as shown in Figure 12. The power law tail, which appears linear in the
logarithmic graphs in Figure 12, is particularly evident in the
distribution of number of citations made. 94

91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. The frequency distribution for citations received is a graph of the number of
patents in the network that were cited k times as a function of k. Similarly, the frequency
distribution for citations made is a graph of the number of patents that made m citations as
a function of m. If a distribution has a "power law tail," the number of patents, N(k), with
a particular number of citations, k, behaves as N(k) - k I for large k. For a more detailed
discussion of such distribution functions, see Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1302-05.
94. The patent citation network distribution of citations received is not quite a power
law at high numbers of citations because of the effects of aging, which are not taken into
account in the Leskovec model. See id. at 1340 (describing the "long, slow decay" of the
power law form).
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Figure 12. The frequency distribution(on a logarithmicscale) of
the number of citations made (top) and received (bottom) at various
times during the evolution of the patent citation network. A "power
law tail" would appearas a straightline on this plot.
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The heavy-tailed distribution for the number of citations
received is intuitively understandable as a result of preferential
attachment and is also a feature of any number of different models
for network growth. 5 The extremely good approximation to a power
law tail observed in the distribution of citations made, along with the
fact that it becomes increasingly heavy-tailed over time, is more
difficult to understand at first blush and is not a feature of most other
network growth models.96 The forest fire model provides an intuitive
underpinning for this somewhat surprising observation.
The heavy tail on the distribution of number of citations received
is due to preferential attachment. Because preferential attachment
leads to a "rich get richer" effect, it results in a long tail in which some
patents receive large numbers of citations. 97 The long tail on the
distribution of number of citations made cannot be due to a
preferential attachment mechanism because the citations made by a
given patent are selected once and for all at the time the patent issues.
It is thus somewhat surprising that the distribution of citations made
does not follow a normal, bell-shaped distribution.9"
The recursive mechanism for selecting citations in the forest fire
model provides a link between the preferential attachment in
citations received and the distribution of numbers of citations made.
Once a patent happens to cite an already heavily cited patent, it will
tend to "burn through" a correspondingly large number of other
citations, which it will add to its own list of citations with some
probability. Thus, a heavy tail in citations received will be reflected in
a heavy tail in citations made.
Other features characteristic of the forest fire model are also
evident in the patent citation network. The number of citations made
per patent increases over time, as shown in Figure 13. Meanwhile,
the network "diameter," which is defined as the longest "shortest
path" between two patents that are connected by "hopping" along
citation links, decreases, as shown in Figure 14."
95. See, e.g., Albert & Barab~si, supra note 33, at 80-83; Newman, supra note 33, at
213-23.
96. See Leskovec et al., supra note 87, at 177-79.
97. See, e.g., Newman, supra note 33, at 213.
98. We might intuitively predict that patent examiners and applicants would make
roughly the same number of citations in every patent, with some variance depending on
the specifics of the invention. Instead, the number of citations varies widely, with most
patents citing only one or two patents, while a few patents cite hundreds of other patents.
For further discussion of normal and power law distributions as related to network
science, see Strandburg et al., supra note 1, at 1302-05.
99. Leskovec et al., supra note 87, at 181.
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Figure 13. Average number of citationsmade per patent as a
function of time.
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Figure14. Effective diameter of the patent citation network as a
function of time.10
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100. This chart appears in Leskovec, Kleinberg, and Faloutsos's article about the
growth of networks. Id.
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We can use our method for extracting citability functions to
perform an additional check on the forest fire model for the patent
citation network. We do this by extracting citability in terms of a
parameter that indicates whether or not a cited patent is a neighbor of
a patent already cited by the citing patent. We then look to see
whether these neighbors have higher citability than non-neighbors
do. °' The calculation shows a strong preference for citing neighbors.
Indeed, a neighbor of an already cited patent has more than twelve
thousand times higher probability to be cited by the original citing
patent than a non-neighbor patent. This model also has a very high
goodness of fit. 02 The citability functions for neighbors and nonneighbors are shown in Figure 15.
Figure 15. Citabilityfunction of the patent citation network
parameterizedby whether the cited patent is a neighboror nonneighbor of a patent already cited by the citingpatent.
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101. There is one complication in our estimation of the citability function: we do not
know the order of the citations in a given patent. Examiners and patent applicants do not
record which citations are made first, second, etc. To avoid biasing our results in favor of
neighbors or non-neighbors, we assume a random ordering of the citations made by a real
patent. By generating synthetic networks, we found that this procedure yields an unbiased
result, and on average the correct citability function is measured. Csirdi et al., Inverse
Problem, supra note 39, at 24-25.
102. Id.; see supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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These observations beg the question whether patent examiners
and applicants actually use this recursive approach in determining
which patents to cite. While the mechanism seems intuitively
plausible-and something is needed to explain the observed features
of the patent citation network-the model flies somewhat in the face
of common understanding of the way patent examiners search for
prior art using patent classification numbers and keyword searches. 3
Patent applicants also frequently employ patent search firms, which
presumably do at least some of their searching on the basis of patent
classification and keywords." 4
There are a number of possible explanations for the apparently
good fit between the forest fire model and the characteristics of the
patent citation network. One likely possibility is that those searching
for prior art use a combination of search techniques, beginning with
keyword or USPTO classifications and then following citations
recursively. The forest fire model is consistent with this possibility
because it does not account for the choice of the first patent cited but
simply approximates that choice randomly. Another possibility is
that keyword and USPTO classification searching lead to a citation
network that is very similar to that which would have been obtained
through a recursive citation approach. Perhaps, for example, the
recursive approach produces a good fit because patents that cite one
another use similar terminology or because keyword searching is
itself recursive, as one keyword search may suggest further keywords
to try.
To make further progress in understanding the underlying
citation practice and its effects on citation networks, we will have to
expand our approach. We need a better understanding of the
practices of patent examiners and applicants. We also need to study
various models of citation practice to determine whether the
characteristic features of the forest fire model-power law "citations
made" frequency distribution, increasing numbers of citations made
per patents, and shrinking network "diameter"-are also observed in
other models.
One intriguing clue to citation practice is already evident in our
current analysis. In 2001, the USPTO began indicating on the face of
issued patents which citations were made by examiners and which

103. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 20, at 1627-29.
104. John A. Jeffery, Comment, Preserving the Presumption of Patent Validity: An
Alternative to Outsourcing the U.S. Patent Examiner's PriorArt Search, 52 CATH. U. L.
REV. 761, 789-90 (2003) (discussing the role of private patent search firms).
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were made by patent applicants.105 Thus, we can compare the
frequency distribution of citations made by examiners with the
distribution of citations made by patent applicants beginning at that
time. Figure 16 illustrates this difference.
Figure 16. Frequency distribution (on logarithmicscale) of
number of citationsmade by patent examiners (triangles)and patent
applicants (plussigns).
0x
-

0

0

0
00
+-+ +'

0

A

AA 000

all citations
examiner citaations

o

inventor citattions

LM

-

A

A

5

10

50

100

A

0

6AA"*N==M=

500

1000

Citations made

As one can see in Figure 16, patent applicants are responsible for
most of the occasions on which patents make large numbers of
citations. Perhaps patent applicants rely more heavily than patent
examiners on a recursive, citation-based method of looking for prior
art. Of course, it is also possible that patent examiner citations are
truncated because of time constraints that do not affect patent
applicants.0 6 The large number of citations made in some patents is
not a simple result of the behavior of companies with large patent
portfolios. The frequency distribution of number of citations made is
shown in Figure 17 for companies with various sizes of patent
portfolios. There does not appear to be any significant dependence
on portfolio size.
105. See Alcicer, Gittelman & Sampat, supra note 29, at 2-3.

106. Patent examiners are over-burdened with applications to examine and, thus,
spend only about twenty hours examining each application. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller,
Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 667, 733 (2004).
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Figure17. The frequency distribution(on a logarithmicscale) of
the number of citations made by entities which are the assignees of
various numbers of patents.
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3. Summary of Investigation of Citation Practice
We began this Section with the question of whether the observed
evolution of the stratification parameter over time might be explained
by some change in citation practice rather than by a change in the
characteristics of issued patents. The comparison with the physics
journal citation network suggested that the changes in stratification
observed in the patent system were probably not the result of some
universally-applicable change in search technology. The journal
citation results also suggested that the systematic changes in
stratification parameter observed in the patent citation network were
not just "typical" variation for citation networks. In contrast to the
patent citation network, the stratification parameter for the physics
journal citation network was relatively stable over very long periods
of time. Nonetheless, this one comparison is only a hint. It is still
possible, for example, that citation networks for other journals or
other patent systems reflect similar changes, which would undermine
a conclusion that changes in the network of U.S. patent citations
reflect changes in U.S. patent law.
The forest fire model plausibly explains some observed
characteristics of the patent citation network, such as the power law
frequency distribution of number of citations made, the ongoing
increase in citations made per patent, and decrease in citation
network diameter. Nothing we have observed so far suggests that this
basic agreement with the forest fire model changed as the citation
network evolved.0 7
Thus, we have no indication of a basic change in citation practice
that would explain the evolution of the stratification parameter over
time. Nonetheless, a considerably better understanding of both the
real world citation practices of examiners and applicants and the
relationships between various models of citation practice and the
stratification parameter would be needed to provide a definitive
answer to the question of whether citation practice can explain the
observed changes in stratification over time.
CONCLUSION

In this brief update to our network science study of the patent
citation network, we have extended and confirmed our earlier
observation that the citability of patents became increasingly

107. See, for example, Figure 12, which shows how the distribution of citations made
has evolved over time.
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stratified beginning in the late 1980s through the 1990s, suggesting
that the least citable patents were increasingly trivial compared to the
most citable patents. A plausible explanation for the observed
increasing stratification is that the threshold for patentability
decreased during that time. We then deployed an improved
calculation methodology which uncovered an unexpected result: the
stratification of citability hit a plateau around 2000, suggesting that
the threshold for patentability may also have stabilized around that
time. If this explanation for the behavior of the stratification
parameter is correct, we are left with an open question as to the
reason for this stabilization, which far preceded recent changes in
legal doctrine that arguably tightened patentability standards.
Notably, the plateau coincides with a change in patent office
propensity to issue patents; the number of patents issued also leveled
off at around the turn of the century, while the number of
applications continued a meteoric rise.
We also investigated two alternative explanations for the
evolution of the stratification parameter: (1) changes in the
predominance of inventions from different technological fields; and
(2) changes in citation practice, perhaps as a result of digital search
technology. While we cannot yet conclusively rule out these factors
as explanations of the observed changes of stratification over time,
our investigations so far do not lend support to either.
We thus consider it most likely that the evolution of the
stratification parameter reflects changes in the threshold for patent
issuance. If that is the case, it will be important to understand what
happened around 2000 to account for the observed plateau. In the
future, we can also use the stratification parameter to investigate the
aftermath of important doctrinal changes, such as the Supreme
Court's revision of the obviousness standard in KSR v. Teleflex 1°8 and
the Federal Circuit's recent en banc restatement of the standard for
patentable subject matter in In re Bilski. °9

108. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
109. 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc).

